Trump Excludes Iraq’s Popular Mobilization from his Iran Strategy
10/22/2017 7:00:38 PM
Iraqs Popular Mobilization Force commits criminal activities in Kurdish regions
Huffington Post, Oct. 22, 2017 - Trump’s exclusion of Iraq from his enumeration of Iranian violations in the Arab world and the IRGC roles there, in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, has interesting implications. Iraq seems to occupy a special position for President Trump. The prime minister in Baghdad, Haider al-Abadi, may have earned the trust of the US president, and even a preferential position with regard to US support, possibly at the expense of the Kurds, Washington’s erstwhile long-standing ally. Indeed, Trump has overlooked the participation of the Popular Mobilization forces in battles alongside the federal Iraqi forces to retake Kirkuk from the Kurds and other Kurdish-claimed regions in northern Iraq, bearing in mind that the US Treasury Department has now targeted the IRGC as a supporter of designated groups and stepped its sanctions against Tehran’s elite force. Clearly, the state of division within the Kurdish ranks, with accusations of betrayal and treason, is a key factor that led to the current outcome in Iraqi Kurdistan. Clearly too, the Trump administration was furious with Masoud Barzani for rejecting a compromise deal to postpone the referendum for a year – which Washington brokered as the best possible option and formalized through a UN Security Council resolution – and decided to let him bear the consequences of his mistakes alone. The situation in Iraq today indicates the presence of a secret thread not only in Kurdistan but also across the rest of Iraq, where Abadi’s ties to Iran and the PMF overlap with his relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Trump administration.
There is something curious about the Trump administration steering clear of criticizing Abadi’s policies, to the extent of ignoring to place the PMF, which are backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, within Iran’s violations. That despite the fact that Qassem Soleimani continues to publicly tour all parts of Iraq. There is something curious too about the shift taking place in Iraq’s military and civilian ties with the Gulf, towards more normalization and collaboration after a 25-year estrangement. Here, US and Gulf strategies in Iraq overlap in a striking fashion, bearing in mind that Trump’s new strategy on Iran has been welcomed in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab countries, though it has caused concerns in countries that fear the repercussions of a renewed US-Iranian clash, such as Lebanon.
Betting on Trump’s strategy carries risks, however. His announcements about Iran and her adventures outside its borders needs to be coupled with mechanisms and timetables, and a Plan B. The US president himself faces political risks if his promises and pledges turn out to be impracticable.
For instance, it will not be easy to implement Donald Trump’s to delegitimize the Iranian regime, as Trump characterized it deliberately in a departure from the position of his predecessor Barack Obama, who legitimized the Iranian regime from the UN General Assembly. Obama was meeting a key Iranian demand, and implicitly pledging the US would not assist Iran’s opposition. But what can Trump, who has suggested he would do the opposite, do to match his words with deeds, not least because of his domestic woes?
Trump did not officially designate the IRGC as a terror organization, merely announcing new sanctions. On the same day however the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 11 entities and individuals “for engaging in support of designated Iranian actors or malicious cyber-enabled activity”, including arms of the IRGC, which “played a central role to Iran becoming the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror, according to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. Trump and Mnuchin cited the Revolutionary Guards’ support for Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, as grounds for the sanctions.
There is something curious about the Trump administration steering clear of criticizing Abadi’s policies, to the extent of ignoring to place the PMF, which are backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, within Iran’s violations. That despite the fact that Qassem Soleimani continues to publicly tour all parts of Iraq. There is something curious too about the shift taking place in Iraq’s military and civilian ties with the Gulf, towards more normalization and collaboration after a 25-year estrangement. Here, US and Gulf strategies in Iraq overlap in a striking fashion, bearing in mind that Trump’s new strategy on Iran has been welcomed in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab countries, though it has caused concerns in countries that fear the repercussions of a renewed US-Iranian clash, such as Lebanon.
Betting on Trump’s strategy carries risks, however. His announcements about Iran and her adventures outside its borders needs to be coupled with mechanisms and timetables, and a Plan B. The US president himself faces political risks if his promises and pledges turn out to be impracticable.
For instance, it will not be easy to implement Donald Trump’s to delegitimize the Iranian regime, as Trump characterized it deliberately in a departure from the position of his predecessor Barack Obama, who legitimized the Iranian regime from the UN General Assembly. Obama was meeting a key Iranian demand, and implicitly pledging the US would not assist Iran’s opposition. But what can Trump, who has suggested he would do the opposite, do to match his words with deeds, not least because of his domestic woes?
Trump did not officially designate the IRGC as a terror organization, merely announcing new sanctions. On the same day however the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 11 entities and individuals “for engaging in support of designated Iranian actors or malicious cyber-enabled activity”, including arms of the IRGC, which “played a central role to Iran becoming the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror, according to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. Trump and Mnuchin cited the Revolutionary Guards’ support for Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, as grounds for the sanctions.
